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ABSTRACT
Decision Support Systems (DSS) have been identified as a
solution to the military commander's needs for information
filtering and analysis. Current literature on the theory and
techniques of DSS design have been addressed to the decision-
making processes of commercial applications. The lack of a
comprehensive treatement of military command and control
decision-making requirements may result in a number of
command and control DSS which are not designed for the
reliability and flexibility required in a context of ever-
changing threats. This thesis is an initial attempt to
identify some unique considerations for the design of a
command and control decision support system and offers
suggestions towards the development of flexible, reliable
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Navy has been using computers longer than any other
organization. The Harvard Mark I and the ENIAC were
providing data for ballistic studies in the late 1940's.
Since then, the Navy has become dependent on computers for
virtually all its essential activities from payroll to
weapons control [Ref. 1: pp. 6-7]. While such extensive
employment of computing capabilities has without doubt
allowed the Navy to run a leaner, more capable operation, it
has also resulted in the same "information overload" problem
which has received so much publicity in the business press.
Managers and businessmen in the private sector have long
complained that the so-called Management Information Systems,
or MIS, have had little or no beneficial effect on managerial
decision-making. Managers do not need more data; they need a
way to filter data, to view it from different angles, to make
projections, and to conduct variance and sensitivity
analyses. The concept of Decision Support Systems (DSS)
,
which was made possible in the late 1960's with the
introduction of time sharing and remote terminals, provided
the potential for managers to use information "instead of
being buried under it" [Ref. 2: p. 33 ].

Most discussion of the use of DSS to support military
decision-making is limited to proposals and suggestions.
While several projects are underway to field prototype DSS,
the actual capability to perform analyses on data is usually
planned for later versions of the system. This is especially
true for systems which will support such complex and
dif f icult-to-def ine missions such as command and control.
Still, the need is there; commanders on ships and in the
field are just as inundated with data as any other manager,
if not considerably more so. DSS promises to help these
commanders filter information, analyze data, compare
alternatives and transmit commands, all from the same
console.
The Soviets also see the need for command and control
DSS. Fleet Admiral Gorshkov shares our Secretary of
Defense's opinion that the status of a force's Command and
Control elements will be an equally important determinant in
war as that of the level of technology of weapons systems
[Ref. 3: p. 7, Ref. 4: p. 241]. Gorshkov recently presented
a paper in which he identifies the modeling and analytical
capabilities of a Command and Control decision-supporting
computer system as capabilities which will be essential to
permit commanders to make decisions in an environment which
will be distinguished by the "large spatial scope,
accelerated tempo, and sharp variation in the situation...."

With a well-established need, and with the increasing
recognition of the importance of Command and Control, it is
not at all surprising that the concept of Command and Control
DSS has already attracted much attention in the Navy.
Unfortunately, current textbooks and actual DSS examples are
strictly commercial applications for such purposes as
financial and production management. Military planners or
project managers who will be responsible for the design
specifications of Command and Control DSS will find very
little in the way of formal guidance.
The purpose of this research, then, is to consolidate
what information available in the scattering of applicable
articles in military journals with this author's knowledge of
Navy command and control to provide a general outline of
unique considerations in the design of a Command and Control
DSS. It is hoped that this thesis will also serve to
stimulate further interest and research towards more complete
and formal textbooks or manuals on the subject.
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II. A PLACE FOR DSS IN COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control has always been an important element
in war, and in this age of nuclear weapons and the need for
instant response, it has become even more important. Soviet
Fleet Admiral Gorshkov emphasizes the role of command and
control in warfare, "Disrupting enemy control of forces in a
number of instances can produce no less an effect than their
immediate defeat..." [Ref. 3: p. 9].
The current administration has recognized this critical
role of command and control. In his Annual Report to the
Congress for Fiscal Year 1984, Defense Secretary Weinberger
emphasizes the dependence of force capability upon command
and control systems [Ref. 4: p. 241]. Roughly $15 billion a
year is now being invested in these systems, making command
and control the fastest growing functional component of the
U.S, defense budget [Ref. 5: p. 28].
A. TODAY'S COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: THE CHALLENGE
As Secretary Weinberger states in the FY 1984 Report,
"The variety and complexity of our C3I* systems presents us
with an extremely challenging management task" [Ref, 4: p.
241]. Most of our command and control systems evolved




independently and are supported by a collection of equipment
whose architectures are 15 to 30 years old f with low meantime
between failure and high maintenance costs. Like many other
military computer systems they involve software which is
"non-portable, inflexible and largely unresponsive, expensive
to develop and maintain, with little or no interoperability
and few standards.." [Ref. 6: p. 26].]
The challenge today is to upgrade and integrate current
command and control systems and to develop and acquire new
systems which [Ref. 4: pp. 241-242]:
- provide a "proper mix" with weapons systems,
- can evolve with changing needs for information,
- are affordable,
- meet the requirements of the decisionmakers they will
serve,
- are survivable in both lethal and electronic warfare,
- are interoperable, both among our own Services and with
our allies, in joint and combined military operations,
- are consistent with long range plans developed jointly
with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the JCS.
Obviously, such goals will not be achieved overnight.
Command and control is a very complex mission. Robert B.
Doane of the Air Force Systems Command's Electronic Systems
Division states that before it will be possible to develop a
satisfactory command and control architecture, it is first
necessary to undertake "...a concerted effort to define,
with a degree of stability, the top-level information needs
12

for all levels of command, ...from the 'local 1 (battle)
commanders up through the JCS— a very difficult task" [Ref.
7: p. 182].
B. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
Still others say that command and control defies precise
definition, [Ref. 8: pp. 96] and that the "absence of a
succinct statement of objectives" at the national level has
resulted in command and control systems which have been
driven instead by the push for technological sophistication.
[Ref. 9: pp. 48-69] .
There are indeed many different concepts of command and
control. The JCS Pub 1 offers this definition:
"The exercise of authority and direction by properly
designated commanders over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of his mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of
equipment, communication, facilities and procedures in
planning, directing and controlling forces and operations
in the accomplishment of his mission" [Ref. 7: p. 182].
Another definition of command and control emphasizes the
process of decision-making [Ref. 10: p. 15]:
"..a process: or, more accurately, a set of related
processes. It is, first, a process of getting information
to decision makers. Second, it is a process of
interaction between decision makers. Third, it is a
process of implementing their decisions. All three of
these vital processes are centered around decision makers:
the task of command and control is to help them see more
clearly what is happening, decide what to do about it and
implement the necessary actions. "
It is this latter definition which, in the opinion of
this writer, will best support efforts to design integrated
13

command and control systems. Its emphasis on the decision
maker is more promising in achieving Secretary Weinberger's
goal of developing systems which will serve the information
needs of the intended users. Its division of the process of
command and control into the three ' subpr ocesses ' of
gathering information, interaction among decision-makers and
Am£i:£m£H-t.Al!Si decisions highlights the importance of
communications in command and control decision making. It
also closely resembles Simon's paradigm of decision making*
and thus allows inspection of current command and control
systems as to how well they support each of the three stages
of decision making.
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL DECISION-MAKING
The decision-making phases identified by Simon are the
"intelligence" phase, the "des ign". phase and the "choice"
phase. The decision-making process involves the iteration of
these phases, where "intelligence" is the gathering of data,
"design" is the manipulation and analysis of the data, and
"choice" is the selection and implementation of a course of
action.
The intelligence phase of decision-making in command and
control, or the gathering of information is already well-
supported by sophisticated sensors and communications
*See Appendix, Section C.
14

technology. It is the design and choice phases, in which
alternatives are evaluated and implemented, where current
command and control systems provide little support for
commanders. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Engineering and Systems), John Paisley was quoted in SIGNAL
Magazine [Ref. 11: p. 23]:
"Our ability to collect, process and transport information
at prodigious rates is great and continues to expand and
already has exceeded our ability to assimilate and
comprehend. The commander. ..has more information than he
can use. The difficulty is that the information is not
always in the right form or presentation and it may not be
available 'in-time, 1 but without question, he has more than
he can use."
Commanders must be provided some means for "assessment,
aggregation and correlation of vasts amounts of data" and
some way of "filtering the essentials to decision makers at
every level" [Ref. 12: p. 18]. Without such a means to
manage this "information explosion", decision-makers faced
with complex decisions and short time frames must rely soley
on their own heuristic problem-solving abilities which are
limited by small short term memory capacity and the serial,
one-process-at-a-time mode of operation [Ref. 13: p. 40].
Because the nature of modern warfare involves tremendously
fast and accurate weapons, there will be no time to perform
this relatively slow mental problem-solving process for
optimal solutions. While "satisf icing, " or "settling for a
good-enough" solution may serve the needs of other decision
makers [Ref. 14: p. 449], it is not a desirable method for
15

problem-solving when the consequences can affect the lives of
men or the defense and reputation of the country.
The heuristic process of human decision-making can also
result in distortions or biases [Ref. 15: p. 119]. The
decision maker will search for relevant information, but will
use only that which can be made available in the given time
frame. He may interpret data differently depending on the
order or method of presentation. He may select for retention
only that data or information which he understands, or in
which he has particular interest or knowledge. His
expectations may prevent him from accepting the significance
of contradictory information. The frequency of recent events
can cause the decision maker to overlook the more crucial
measure of rate of occurance. Variables may be erroneously
correlated and inferences can be inappropriately derived from
insignificantly small samples. These are just a few of the
problems associated with unaided human decision making. The
consequences for command and control decisions could be at
best inefficient, at worst, disastrous.
D. DSS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
One method to improve the effectiveness of command and
control decision making while eliminating at least some of
these human biases, is to provide commanders with decision
support systems [Ref. 16: p. 45]. A prototype DSS, the
Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC) , is currently under
16

development and will provide Navy Officers in Tactical
Command a "battle station which is automated to assimilate
and display organic and non organic sensor tactical data" and
will "enable him to coordinate and control assigned tasks in
the increasingly complex tactical situations..." [Ref. 17: p.
32-33]. Other such systems are being planned to support
commanders in all services.
Evidently the need to support decision makers in all
three phases of decision making has been recognized. DSS may
well be the answer. However, the fielding of such systems
cannot be done successfully without careful planning and
integration into an overall systems architecture. Command
and control systems must be interoperable and survivable if
they are to serve decision makers in combat environments.
They must be integrated with complex weapons systems and thus
incorporate some well-defined strategies and tactics.
Furthermore, they must be affordable and take into
consideration life cycle costs of maintenance.
The design of command and control DSS is much more
complicated than that of a DSS intended for commercial uses.
The following chapter will attempt to identify some of the
major difficulties associated with developing such a system
for command and control.
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III. FITTING A DSS INTO THE COMMAND AND CONTROL
ARCHITECTURE: ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
A. IMPLEMENTING NEW TECHNOLOGY
A DSS cannot be bought 'off the shelf and simply
"plugged in." Instead, the design and implementation must
involve analyses of (1) the implicit affects upon the users
and upon the context or organization in which they operate,
and (2) limitations or requirements imposed by the supporting
technology. Too often, the implementation of a new
technology has been viewed as a "discrete-entity" process in
which the technical merits of the new system(s) would
determine effectiveness, independently of the specific
characteristics of the organization [Ref. 18: pp. 7-8]. Such
a practice is at least partly responsible for the lack of
integration of the various components of the current command
and control architecture [Ref. 19: p. 16].
A DSS is a form of technology in that it is a technique
by which an organization or individual transforms inputs to
outputs and which involves equipment, automation, and
problem-solving methods. Thus, the implementation of a DSS
can "require subsequent changes in task, structure or
individual" [Ref. 20: p. 126]. Some of these changes may be
easily predicted, some easily quantified in terms of cost.
18

More thoughtful analyses usually result in the identification
of affects which are not readily quantified in terms of
expected costs [Ref. 21: p. 223].
An attempt to estimate the costs associated with the
implementation of a DSS for command and control purposes in
the military will be very difficult, for there has been very
little effort to develop a theory of current command and
control decision making processes [Ref. 8: p. 45-49, Ref. 22:
p. 45-49]. A cost/benefit analysis would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, without some understanding and
ability to quantify, for purposes of comparison, the
effectiveness of the current methods of command and control
decision-making.
It is possible, and highly advisable when introducing a
new system into an environment characterized by high
technology and low structure (low level of integration), that
some attempt is made to identify the "area of change" and
perform what is has come to be known as a "risk analysis"
[Ref. 23: p. 325]. Such a risk analysis is undertaken for
early identification of potential problem areas and
appropriate managerial or technical means by which to lessen
the risks.
This chapter presents some organizational and technical
factors which may require consideration by those who are
responsible for the development of a command and control DSS.
19

The list is by no means complete, for depending on the
particular situation and environment there will probably be
more specific factors which will also require attention. The
intent here is to develop an appreciation for some of the
generally-applicable, but often neglected, organizational and
technical factors which can affect the performance of a DSS
in a command and control setting.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS
1. Strategic Balance
Dramatic improvements in our command and control
capabilities could have the effect of negating or reducing
one or more perceived advantages of an adversary's weapons
capabilities [Ref. 24: p. 4, Ref. 25: p. 248]. It would then
be possible that the new command and control capability may
itself become the subject of strategic arms negotiations
[Ref. 26: p. 424]. If the DSS should incorporate real-time
satellite data for an improved ability to "scan the
battlefield," it may well raise questions as to whether this
will increase or decrease the likelihood that nuclear weapons
will be used [Ref. 27: p. 26]. The impact of new command and
control capabilities on the strategic balance and on arms
talks will largely depend on whether the new capabilities are
perceived by our adversaries, especially the Soviet Union, as
offensive or as defensive capabilities [Ref. 25: p. 246].
20

2. Centralized vs. Decentralized Command Authority
Depending on the communications capabilities provided
in the design, a command and control DSS may further the
trend towards centralization of command authority. If the
DSS is designed to meet the objective of enhancing
communications among the various echelons of command, it may
provide central headquarters authorities with rapid feedback
of subordinate actions and with the ability to monitor in a
real-time manner, the behavior and events at the lower
echelons [Ref. 20: p. 177]. This will be viewed favorably by
those who feel that the threat of escalation to nuclear
exchange mandates central control during any conflict [Ref.
20: p. 141, Ref. 28: p. 8, Ref. 29: p. 266]. Others argue
that commanders at the level of engagement have neither the
time nor the inclination to accept control from remote
authority [Ref. 30: p. 45, Ref. 31: p. 23, Ref. 32: p. 20].
Computers themselves do not enforce centralization or
decentralization of authority. The choice is one of strategy
and politics. The issue has already attracted much debate
and has produced concepts of command and control which differ
as to degree and location of control and responsibility. The
Composite Warfare Commander and the Fleet Command Center
concepts are two examples, the former advocating
decentralization of control of warfare mission areas to at
least 3 warfare commanders, the latter holding that control
21

by safely remote experts will simplify decision-making for
on-scene commanders.
Before it will be possible to establish the
information requirements of the users of a proposed command
and control DSS, it will be necessary to agree on this aspect
of command [Ref. 33: p. 31, Ref. 34: p. 418].
3. Defense Strategy
If the DSS is to provide the commander with such
capabilities as threat evaluation, targeting prioritization,
and situation analysis, it will necessarily involve models
which cannot be designed without a clear definition of
defense strategy and associated tactics. Critics argue that
no such clearly defined strategy exists [Ref. 35, Ref. 36:
pp. 9-12, Ref. 37, Ref. 38: p. 14]. Others suggest that
current strategy has fallen out of step with the new threats
and new weapons capabilities, especially in that forces and
tactics are organized for a war of attrition when modern
warfare's dispersed and decentralized characteristics more
appropriately call for maneuverability and deception [Ref.
39: p. 18, Ref. 40: p. 33, Ref. 41].
The role of command and control capabilities and
facilities in supporting the defense strategy must also be
defined in order to design and implement an effective command
and control DSS. Today there are no clear statements of
22

objectives for command and control support of the forces
[Ref. 9: p. 52],
4. Interoperability
In the past, disregard for the interdependencies of
various command and control systems has resulted in "separate
programs, different rates of evolution, different
protocols.." [Ref. 19: p. 18]. Don Latham, DUSD for C3I,
referred recently to the almost unbelievable interoperability
problems which have resulted. The present command and
control resources "must be integrated into an overall plan to
insure efficient employment and to avoid duplication of
capabilities in future procurement" [Ref. 42: p. 2],
Interoperability of command and control systems is
not an issue which can be addressed as an afterthought.
Modern warfare with its broad area sensors and long range
weapons requires that information be rapidly and reliably
exchanged among systems at a variety of levels of command,
between forces of the various services and between the United
States and its allies [Ref. 43: p. 45]. It may even be
advisable, considering the confusion and uncertainty
surrounding the scene of future warfare [Ref. 44] and the
constant threat of escalation, that our command and control
systems be designed for "adversarial communications," or
interoperability with non-friendly forces [Ref. 45: p. 90],
23

While it may be neither feasible nor desirable to
design a given DSS for interoperability with all of the major
systems, identification of desirable connectivity in the
early stages of the system development cycle will reduce
costly efforts to upgrade the system for such a capability at
a later date.
5 . Command Responsibility
The research involved in the preparation of this
thesis uncovered not a single mention of the issue of
responsibility for results of command decisions which are
based on the information provided by a command and control
DSS. Nevertheless, the issue seems worth mentioning; perhaps
it will be raised officially once DSS actually become
operational in command and control settings.
If the commander today is to be provided with a set
of models and data to help him deal with the so-called data-
explosion, then will he still be held responsible for the
accuracy of those models and data? If the DSS is to be used
under combat or crisis situations, will the commander be
expected to assess the validity of the results of his queries
to the system. It is not inconceivable that an error in the
design of a model, or in the transparent data source could go
undetected until the investigation which would follow an
unfortunate, and possibly, a very costly, decision.
24

Clarification of this issue before asking commanders
to use a DSS may at least serve to develop in those
commanders a desire to fully understand the models and
capabilities provided by the system. To neglect this issue
is to risk reinforcement of a common tendency to distrust
both models and computers— a result which will negate the
potentials of DSS in command and control.
C. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Command and control systems must be both reliable and
flexible. The degrees of reliability and flexibility needed,
and the ability to achieve them, is largely a function of the
particular uses and operating environments of each system.
The operating environment of a tactical command and control
system presents more design problems than that of a
strategic system due to the more restrictive availability of
maintenance support, power, and space aboard mobile
platforms. The following technical considerations for the
design of a command and control DSS are discussed in terms of
flexibility and reliability and apply specifically to
tactical systems. Some of these comments may prove equally
applicable to strategic systems.
1. Flexibility
The rapidly changing nature of the command and
control environment and of computer hardware and software
technology calls for a great deal of flexibility in the
25

components of the DSS. The modular concepts of software
engineering as described by Constantine, Myers and Stevens
[Ref. 46: pp. 115-138] will be useful for a command and
control DSS. The basic idea is to design the system as a set
of loosely-coupled segments where any one function is fully
contained within a single segment, or module. This allows
the isolation into separate modules of the various likely
"areas of change." The same modular concept can be applied to
the design of the hardware components at the box, board or
chip level [Ref. 39: p. 2], While the details of the
processing techniques should be left to the contractor, the
modular approach to design can be specified in the contract
as a mandatory equipment specification [Ref. 47].
The following points emphasize the need for command
and control software to be designed for flexibility:
1. Algorithms and data may need frequent revision
due to the rapidly changing capabilities and nature of
weapons systems and threats. Modular software, with its
separation of "areas of change," will greatly reduce
reprograming effort and cost and will lessen the risk of
negatively affecting other portions of the software.
2. User needs vary across users and individually
over time. Some users prefer graphic displays over
tabulated data. Some users will need more "help"
instructions to operate the systems. Some will become
expert users with experience and would become frustrated if
there were no means to bypass the more basic help
instructions for faster response [Ref. 48: pp. 16-17].
3. The decision-making processes for peacetime
operations are distinctly different from those which are
necessary for combat operations [Ref. 49: p. 93, Ref. 50:
p. 15]. The DSS should support both of these decision-
making processes and provide for a smooth transition from
26

one to the other. This means that while the system should
provide different models, data and response times, it
should not require any major changes in operation.
4. The system will require changes as more is
learned about command and control decision-making in
general, and as the user provides feedback as to how the
system could better meet his needs. Current knowledge of
command and control decision-making is incomplete, and as
weapons and tactics undergo constant changes, the study of
such decision-making will be an ongoing effort [Ref. 22: p.
34, Ref. 8: p. 96].
5. A modular design will reduce software maintenance
efforts, which typically account for an estimated 67% of
total effort expended on large-scale software systems [Ref.
51: p. 204]. Maintenance involves correcting newly-
discovered errors, performing planned updates and making
adjustments for change in local conditions (such as changes
in the hardware). Approximately 70% of the total cost of
software systems over the life cycle occurs during this
maintenance stage [Ref. 51: p. 204]. This figure could
increase if the current upward trend in the cost of
programming continues [Ref. 46: p. 136]. Simplified
software maintenance is also particularly important for
tactical systems due to the difficulty in providing skilled
personnel to perform the maintenance and due to the impact
of downtime on mission performance.
6. A modular software design will permit separation
of the communications processing subsystem and thus allow
for flexibility in sources of data input [Ref. 52: p. 96].
This is an important consideration since communications
media are subject to both natural disturbances and, in
conflict, intentional disruption. The communications
subsystem should be readily and easily reprogr amable for
such changes and should have no affect on the rest of the
system, save perhaps a short time delay.
7. If the database is limited by storage capacity,
it may be desirable to provide off-line disk storage for
different communications subprocessing programs, models,
and data files.
2. Reliability
A command and control DSS will no doubt be a great
decision-making aid in peacetime. The commander will
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appreciate a system which helps him filter and make effective
use of all the data available to him. He will also grow
accustomed to have such aid. The DSS would be
counterproductive, however, if it ceases to function during a
combat situation when he may most need it. It is therefore
necessary to take every precaution to "harden" the system and
to ensure the integrity and availability of its supporting
data, models and hardware. The following discussions of
hardware, communications and data model reliability will
point out some of the potential problems which, if considered
during the early development stages, can be countered with
appropriate hardware and software techniques,
a. Hardware Reliability
Defense system requirements are vastly different
from those of the commercial sectors. Command and control
systems, in particular, require very reliable and rapid
processing of real time data streams [Ref. 53: p. 358].
Furthermore, defense systems, especially tactical systems,
are constrained by weight, power, and size limitations and
are subjected to far more extreme environmental hazards such
as high temperatures, radiation and vibration [Ref. 54: p.
346] .
The introduction of new hardware to support a
command and control DSS provides an opportunity to improve
28

reliability through the use of 'Very Large Scale Integration 1
or 'Very High Scale Integrated Circuitry' (VHSIC).
(1) VHSIC Technology . Commercial semi-conductor
designs cannot meet the speed, density and reliability
requirements of a command and control system [Ref. 55: p.
340]. The VHSIC program was initiated in 1980 by the
Department of Defense to overcome these technological
barriers with the more capable chip. The new chips will
provide more processing capability and higher throughput
capacity. The reduction in vulnerable interconnections among
chips which results, serves to increase reliability. The
reduction in feature size of integrated circuits on these
chips also allows for built-in testing techniques which can
greatly simplify maintenance-- a distinct advantage in the
tactical field [Ref. 56: p. 344].
(2) EMP Shielding . Solid state circuitry is
very vulnerable to electromagnetic pulsing. Most new command
and control systems programs have set aside funds for
protective Faraday shielding at the "box" level. The larger
the "box," the more expensive the shielding. VHSIC will
greatly reduce the sizes of these components, or boxes, and
thus provide savings in shielding costs [Ref. 57: p. 240,
Ref. 5: p. 27].
(3) Hard w are Maintenance . Although the reli-
ability of individual electronic components in military
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systems has steadily improved over the years, the complexity
of these systems has grown even more rapidly as a result of
escalating performance demands. The amount and complexity of
unscheduled maintenance is unacceptable and degrades mission
performance [Ref. 58: p. 11, Ref. 59: p. 15]. VHSIC
technology promises to greatly improve performance and
reliability as well as the extra advantages of reduced
"payload:
"
"...VHSIC technology could be used to reduce size, weight,
power, failure rate, and unit cost, each by factors ranging
from 20 to 200; the processing throughput could be
increased by a factor of about 150" [Ref. 56: p. 343].
b. Data Communications Reliability
(1) The Proble m. Much of the data needed for a
command and control DSS will be provided by real-time
transmission over communications media. As mentioned
earlier, the DSS should not be affected by the need to switch
to an alternate path or medium in the case of signal loss on
the original path. It is also necessary to plan for the
inability to reestablish communications, or the complete loss
for an extended period of time of critical data sources.
Signal degradation and path failure occur
even in peace time due to equipment failure and inclement
weather. The probability of losing communications circuits
increases greatly when hostile forces deliberately attempt to
jam, interfere or otherwise sabotage communications
capabilities and facilities. Threats range from the
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destruction of fixed communications stations and satellite
earth terminals to laser attacks on the satellites
themselves. The Soviets are developing laser-capable
spacecraft which will threaten our communications satellites,
and already they have the capability to blind our low-orbit
(100 miles) satellites with their land-based laser devices
[Ref. 60: pp. 16-19]. The threat to our satellite
communications capabilities is an especially serious threat
to the Navy as its tactical command and control is heavily
reliant upon satellite links [Ref. 61: p. 49].
A NATO official describes the vulnerability
of the data communications which support the NATO Air Command
and Control System (ACCS) [Ref. 62: p. 16]:
"We see as a critical and vulnerable element of the ACCS
the su seep tab i 1 i ty to jamming of its tactical
communications links, with the probability that the flow of
essential weapon control data would disrupted and the
decision making process would be seriously inhibited at all
levels."
The October issue of Defense '82 describes
the vulnerability of "the major part, if not all, of our
existing C3 capability" to a coordinated Soviet attack with
air and sea-launched cruise missiles and long-range bombers
[Ref. 63: p. 8]. Nuclear weapons pose an even greater threat
in that Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) can be carried for long
distances in unpredictable directions by the atmospheric
pressures. EMP is known to have the effect of "freezing"
solid state circuitry, at least temporarily. A small two
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megaton burst can damage an unprotected satellite up to
22,500 miles away [Ref. 64: p. 27].
(2) Solutions , Lt. General William J. Hilsman,
Director, Defense Communications Agency, expressed his
concerns in a recent interview that the military
communications system is too heavily reliant on fixed
communications stations. Both he and the NATO ACCS officials
support the theory that modern day warfare would be better
supported by distributed data communications which do not
rely on the continued operation of any one node. Already
some C3 systems , such as the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System, are being developed to facilitate
secure, flexible and jam-resistant data and voice transfer in
real time among the dispersed and mobile elements of the
military services [Ref. 65: pp. 15-17]. The concept of data
distribution has not been easily accepted. It may be many
years before the communications system architecture can be
changed for less reliance on fixed stations, due to
bureaucratic and organizational inertia and the general
difficulty in getting command and control systems approved
and funded through Congress [Ref. 58: pp. 11, 14].
The use of high frequency (HF) communications
links will also add appreciably to the probability of
successful communications. The reliability in peacetime
operations of satellite links and the memories of once
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unreliable HF path quality have resulted in the neglect of
the HF frequency band. The new "chirp-sounder" equipment,
currently being fielded by the Defense Communications Agency,
has increased HF path reliability to 90% [Ref. 58: p. 12].
Chirp sounders automatically sample the spectrum for tuning
into good frequencies. Also, the HF spectrum has a unique
capability to propagate beyond line-of-sight using reasonable
size antennas and relatively modest output power.
Command and control DSS should be designed
to take advantages of the capabilities of the HF frequency
band as either a primary system or as backup to a satellite
or other relay system. Jamming resistance can be provided by
the use of frequency-hopping techniques and coded burst
communication [Ref. 66: pp. 380-388].
Communications reliability can be also be
improved by the use of redundant transmissions or dedicated
back-up circuits. An analysis of information needs and
available communications paths should identify the most
survivable paths and backups for the high priority data
needs. The DSS can then be designed to accommodate these
communications media and to allow for flexibility to make
necessary changes. The data analysis may also indicate a
need to develop contingency plans for cases when
communications cannot be reestablished for particular
circuits. The loss of data may mean the inability to use
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certain models available in the DSS. The commander should be
aware of the affects of data communications loss on DSS
operation and of possible alternate methods of receiving data
(over voice circuits) for possible manual insertion.
The point here is planning. The Soviets
have invested heavily in Electronic Counter Measures, or what
they call "Radio Electronic Combat" [Ref. 67: p. 10]. Until
our C3 systems are fully survivable, it would be dangerous to
allow commanders to become accustomed to or dependent on a
decision-making system whose operation is dependent on the
availability of vulnerable, limited data sources, without
providing contingency plans.
c. Model Reliability
Models are what distinguishes a DSS from other
information management systems. A command and control DSS
will employ models to integrate data from a variety of
sources, including real-time sensor sources, for the purpose
of situation analysis. Models may also be provided within
the DSS for performing combat simulations for planning
purposes.
Thus models used in a command and control DSS can
range from the straight- for ward algorithms used in
calculating distance-to-target to the more complex, multiple
variable, multiple algorithm models of threat evaluation. A
Comptroller General Report to the Congress [Ref. 38]
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distinguishes models as those which solve "rigorously
quantifiable" problems and those which solve "squishy
problems.
"
While all models are subject to design errors, it
is the "squishy" problem-solving models which deserve
particular attention by those who intend to have them
incorporated into a command and control DSS. Once these
models have been approved for the system, the intended users
should also be made aware of both the capabilities and
limitations of each model. Where possible it is even
advisable to provide for user participation in the design of
models. User understanding is important both for building
trust in the system and for avoiding gross misinterpretation
of results [Ref. 68: p. 57].
(1) Assumptions in Models . Modelling is more an
art than a science. It is impossible, in many cases, to
quantify some of the variables which contribute greatly to
the outcome of events, such as the effects of darkness or
stress, the complex interactions of weapons systems, and the
roles of C3 and counter-C3. In other cases, it is necessary
to omit even some quantifiable variable inputs due to the
inability to process all the inputs in the necessary time
frame. The model-builder must determine which variables are
the most critical and of those, which can be included
included for realistic processing times. His or her
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assumptions, then, are one of the weaknesses inherent in the
modelling process [Ref. 68: p. 56].
(2) Data Verification . Another basic weakness
is the inability to verify data. Many of the calculations
performed by combat models depend on quantifiable performance
ratios of various weapons systems. Some of these weapons
have had very little testing under realistic conditions.
Nuclear weapons have undergone virtually no realistic
testing. Even where data is available, it is subject to
frequent change and rapidly outdated by weapons system
technology. Sources for weapons data have sometimes been
historical, often from unlocatable or inaccessible classified
documents. Some figures are sheer estimates on the part of
analysts. Currently there exists no single complete source
of weapons data; the Command and Control Technical Center in
the Pentagon has just recently begun to establish such a
data bank. The lack of standard data has resulted in models
which vary widely throughout the Department of Defense [Ref.
69: pp. 73-78]..
(3) Aggregated Models . Aggregated models are
perhaps the "shakiest" of all models. They lump together
similar types of weapons into a composite index which is then
used to represent the combat power of a military force. Both
the model and the input data for such aggregation involve
critical assumptions about tactics, rates of fire and
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distribution of that fire [Ref. 69: p. 56]. Use of such
models should be for general planning and comparison purposes
only.
(4) Model Interpretation . If the builders of
models could explain and document their assumptions to the
end users, the current problem with interpretation might be
somewhat alleviated. As it is, modellers have limited and
infrequent contact with users or their organizations [Ref.
69: p. 31] and documentation is as much a neglected item as
it has been with most other Department of Defense software
systems.
(5) Combining Models . In defining information
needs, it sometimes seems desirable to utilize outputs of one
model as inputs to another [Ref. 69: p. 79]. It can be done,
but experts warn that the programming effort will be
horrendous [Ref. 70: p. 99, Ref. 71: p. 340]. Furthermore,
errors in the first model can be so compounded by subsequent
models as to invalidate the results [Ref. 68: p. 57].
(6) Model Validation . A last warning, from a
NATO operations analyst who creates combat models for a
living, should emphasize the uncertainty inherent in the
processes of modelling [Ref. 68: p. 55]:
..in spite of the intellectual resources devoted on both
sides of the Atlantic to modelling techniques, there is no
agreed, coherent theory or set of criteria by which one can
asses the suitability of any given model.
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The point in this section on Model
Reliability is not to discount the advantages or deny the
need for the use of models, but instead, to develop a sense
of caution in order that command and control DSS designers
will demand documentation of assumptions in models and of
data sources for models which will eventually support a
decision maker's judgement, for [Ref. 69: p. 73] :
.. when that judgement is 'extended' by a model -- a model
that uses unverified assumptions that go beyond science and
objective fact—how can the decision maker be sure that
the model is in fact, serving as an extension of his/her
own judgement...
The next chapter on implementation presents
the concept of a command and control system test bed. The
test bed simulates the command and control environment and
could be used as one check for validity of models. The real
test will be actual combat use. Careful design and




IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL DSS IMPLEMENTATION
The evolutionary or prototype approach to implementation
of a DSS is especially applicable to systems designed for
command and control purposes:
...every design problem begins with an effort to achieve
fitness between two entities: the form in question and its
context. The form is the solution to the problem; the
context defines the problem. In other words, when we speak
of design, the real object of discussion is not the form
alone but the ensemble comprising the form and its
context. Good fit is a desired property of this ensemble
into form and context [Ref. 72: p. 33].
Fitting a DSS into the very complex context of command
and control will require the flexibility of an evolutionary
development approach. While government regulations and the
military personnel turnover problem will complicate the
implementation process, the results of a prototyping approach
will better meet commanders' decision-making needs in the
rapidly changing command and control setting.
A. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION
The traditional approach to systems acquisition and
implementation, still used for most command and control
systems, follows a sequential approach from requirements
definition, to advanced development, to fielding and support.
Even when this sequence of events is iterated, the ultimate
goal is the "freezing of the specs" in the requirements
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definition phase. While this traditional process seems
reasonable for weapons/platform acquisition, it is not
advisable in unstructured settings [Ref. 73: pp. 1-8] as it
intimidates the decision-makers, forces premature closing on
problem-solving approaches, and inhibits the important
learning and search processes that are essential for managers
to undertake in addressing less strctured tasks.
In general, DSS will experience a very short
periodicity— or serviceability--before requiring hardware,
or more likely, software changes for restructuring, updating
or expansion [Ref. 73: p. 5]. The following characteristics
apply to command and control systems and should serve to
explain their short periodicity [Ref. 74: pp. 19-20]:
- Only a few of a kind are procured.
- The systems are embedded in larger systems.
- The measures of success are difficult to define.
- Continuity of operations is essential.
- The systems embody changing tactics and procedures.
- The systems are software-dominated.
A seventh characteristic which affects command and
control systems periodicity is the unpredictability of
funding [Ref. 58: p. 14]. Planned capabilities may have to be
dropped when funds are cut in the eleventh hour.
Thus a command and control DSS will be a unique set of
software, custom tailored but flexible enought to meet the
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specific decision-making styles and information requirements
of a commander who operates in an unpredictable and rapidly
changing environment. It would be very difficult to
determine at once all the objectives of a given system or how
the users will respond to particular configurations and
capabilities.
B. PROTOTYPING
The prototype approach accommodates these uncertainties
by phased implementation of versions, where the first version
is a "breadboard" or minimum requirements system. The
determination of the minimum requirements will require
considerable time and effort up front [Ref. 74: p. 25].
Subsequent versions, providing funding is available, can add
new capabilities, make modifications, or incorporate
advantages of new hardware or software technologies, all
based on user feedback from in-context testing. The concept
of modular hardware and software design is highly compatible
with the prototyping approach to implementation. Together,
these techniques can produce a system which is designed from
the start to accommodate growth and change and to accept
"graceful insertion" of new technologies [Ref. 75: p. 39].
C. BENEFITS OF PROTOTYPING
Some of the benefits of prototyping are, briefly [Ref.
76: p. 65] :
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1. Reduction of Total Cost
Over one-half of the total software in command and
control systems tends to be unique, costly, one-time
development efforts. The modular approach to implementation,
with its built-in expectation of change, reduces overall
development and maintenance costs [Ref. 77: p. 50].
2. Reduction of Initial Risk
Instead of dedicating large dollar amounts and human
resources to a long-term, "one-shot" program which defies
evaluation until completion, prototyping allows minimum
initial investments and constant evaluation. Success at each
stage could make the next stage easier to justify and fund.
Errors are more easier and less costly to track to sources,
and corrections of errors are less likely to cause unexpected




Changes in tactics, weapons or other decision-making
criteria will not render the system obsolescent as it can be
more readily adjusted to accommodate those changes.
4. Higher Operational Readiness
Prototyping can provide for the early fielding of
minimum capabilities rather than the long delay in waiting
for an entire system to be developed.
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D. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTOTYPING
The prototyping approach requires the availability and
skilled use of advanced software techniques in order to
facilitate the many changes to versions. The following
resources will provide programming and design advantages
which can speed the development effort and prevent the
problems of constantly "reinventing the wheel" with each
version [Ref. 72: p. 34]:
1. DBMS
A database management system (DBMS) will provide for
rapid and relatively-easy creation, revision, and extension
of data access methods, storage structures and security
measures. Ideally, the DBMS will have extensive reporting
facilities for design management purposes.
2. Generalized Input/Output Software
Output formats and displays can be more rapidly
designed with the use of report generators, report writers
and query languages. Generalized input software automates
the editing, validation and error correction procedures which





While most command and control algorithms may require
the efficiency of assembly language, high level languages can
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be used where efficiency is not paramount, for simplified
coding, testing and documentation.
4. Modelling
The need for models has already been discussed. The
use of a model base management system for the integration of
models into a "model bank" is advisable for rapid
construction and use of models [Ref. 70: pp. 98-110].
5. Time
To the above resources as offered by Naumann and
Jenkins, it seems necessary to add the element of time as a
resource. Prototyping depends on user evaluation in context.
Thus the user must be able to dedicate sufficient time, away
from his other duties, to experiment with and evaluate each
version. For some command and control systems it may prove
difficult to test versions on the very platforms in which
they will operate. Tight operating schedules may indicate
the need to make use of a command and control test bed to
simulate the intended operational environment [Ref. 78: pp.
103-106]
.
E. DISADVANTAGES OF PROTOTYPING
All methods have drawbacks. The following disadvantages
apply to prototyping for most DSS [Ref. 79: p. 22]:
- Large amount of user time required
- Requires highly talented system designer
- Possible reprogramming needed for efficiency
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- Lack of standards and documentation can complicate
maintenance
- Highly susceptible to user/implementer turnover
- Continuous change can be frustrating
- Unweildy with more than 2 or 3 users
The user/designer turnover problem is one that the
military, with its policy of rotation, will have to live
with. In at least one DSS case, it has resulted in the
complete failure of the system [Ref. 80: pp. 542-455]. The
other problems mentioned by Alter, can be approached with
good planning and use of resources and the establishment of
good user-designer relations.
A problem not mentioned by Alter, and probably unique to
federal systems acquisition, is the difficulty in getting
away from the traditional systems development process. A new
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 for evolutionary
acquisition has not been applied consistently "partly because
the concept of evolutionary acquisition is not well
understood, and partly because of resistance to the special
management procedures and changes.. which are required" [Ref.
81: p. 9].
F. SUMMARY
The rapidly changing environment which distinguishes
command and control calls for an acquisition and
implementation strategy which allows for greater flexibility
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and user involvement than is possible with the traditional
phased development process. Personnel turnover and rigid
governmental acquisition regulations may complicate the
process, but the prototype approach to implementation seems
the most promising for the accommodation of change, growth
and new technology insertion, as well as budget limitations,
of command and control systems.
46

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Command and control DSS have the potential to fulfill the
information requirements of individual commanders while also
filling the gap of distributed decision-making between
service echelons and across service systems. Already there
is a strong movement underway to apply the concept of DSS to
command and control purposes. The command and control DSS
which are currently under development are breaking new
ground. There is as yet, no one source of guidance for the
designers or project managers of these systems. Current
texts have been written for strictly commercial purposes
such as banking and finance. These texts provide a wealth of
information about the design techniques used in creating DSS,
but do not address issues which are critical for the design
of military DSS.
Military decision-making involves several echelons of
command authority, real-time communications-dependent data,
highly unpredictable events and results which can affect
national defense. For these reasons, careful consideration
must be given in the early development phases, of the
following issues:
- The affects of the DSS on the organization's decision-
making processes
- Optimal use of available DSS capabilities
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- Interoperability with other systems as necessary
- Identification of tactics and strategies
- Legal issues of command resposibility in use of DSS
- Current and expected requirements for reliability
- Support for both peacetime and combat decision-making
- Decision-making styles of users
- Likely "areas of change" for separation into modules
- Availability/ease of software and hardware maintenance
- Reliability of data communications sources
- Protection against EMP
- Possible advantages of VHSIC
- Reliability of supporting models
- User understanding and acceptance of models
- Advantages of evolutionary approach to implementation
- User involvement in design and implementation
These are all considerations which will involve
approaches and problems unique for command and control
systems. The answers will not be found in current literature
on DSS. Some suggestions have been made in the preceeding
chapters, but specific solutions to problems will, of course,
depend on the particular context and applications of each
system. It is hoped that this thesis will stimulate further
research and interest in the identification of methods and
techniques which will result in more capable, reliable




A SUMMARY OF CURRENT LITERATURE ON DSS
The concept of a DSS has evolved since Michael S. Scott
Morton's description in the early 1970's of a management
decision system. Today a standard definition of a DSS is:
...an interactive computer-based system which helps
decision-makers utilize data and models to solve
unstructured problems [Ref. 82: p. 40].
The following characteristics of a DSS were determined by
300 users, developers, researchers and vendors at the First
International Conference on Decision Support Systems in June
1981 [Ref. 82: p. 6] :
- Aimed at the less well-structured, under spec i f ied
problems typically faced by upper-level managers
- Combine use of models or analytic techniques with
traditional data access and retrieval functions
- User initiated and controlled
- User-friendly with rapid response
- Tailored to individual decision-maker's style and
information needs
- Flexible and adaptable to accommodate changes in
environment and decision-making approach of user
Some additional characteristics of a DSS as presented by
authors of important texts on the subject:
- Focus on improving effectiveness of manager's decision
process [Ref. 21: p. 2]
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Provides managers with access to both internal and
external data sources [Ref. 82: pp. 31-32]
Usually requires separate, or extracted, data base to
accommodate user's personal and unofficial data and
information
A. DSS VS. EDP AND MIS
Before developing further these DSS concepts, the
following descriptions of Electronic Data Processing (EDP)
and Management Information Systems (MIS) may help to clear
some of the difficulty and controversy with the terms DSS,
MIS and EDP.
EDP was the earliest form of computer support to
organizations. It involved automation of large-scale,
batch, operations such as payroll, invoicing, inventory and
record-keeping. The emphasis was on the automation of
routine data or transaction processing. Basic EDP
characteristics include [Ref. 82: p. 6]:
- Focus on data, storage, processing, and flows at the
operational level
- Efficient transaction processing
- Scheduled and optimized computer runs
- Integrated files for related jobs
- Summary reports for management.
With the more sophisticated, third-generation computers
and their economies of scale, higher-level languages,
operating systems, remote terminal and query capabilities,
organizations began in the latter 'sixties to develop more
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integrated sets of specific data bases. These data bases
tended to be centrally located and organized by functional
applications. Such MIS systems are the most common type of
computer support in organizations today. The introduction in
the latter 'seventies of complex database management systems
(DBMS) has permitted the sharing among functional
applications of pertinent organizational data and
information. Report-generation capabilities have made
possible the request and receipt of summaries by managers,
often from their remote terminals.
The name 'MIS' has been somewhat misleading. Most
experts today contend that the rigid reports produced by MIS
have had little significant impact on management decision-
making processes [Ref. 83: p. 3]. Some critics have gone so
far as to imply that "MIS is a mirage" which has merely
created more data for the already over-burdened manager [Ref.
84: pp. 123-132] .
In any case, the following characteristics are usually
associated with MIS [Ref. 21: pp. 1-2, Ref. 82: pp. 7, 31]:
- Information-focused for middle managers
- Impacts structured tasks, where standard operating
procedures, decision rules, and information flows can be
reliably predefined
- Integration of EDP jobs by business function (personnel,
marketing, etc.)
- Inquiry and report-generation capabilities
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- Emphasis on efficiency (costs, turn-around time,
personnel reductions)
- Indirect support for managers decision-making, in the
form of reports and access to data
- Database restricted to internally-generated aggregate or
historical data.
MIS continues to hold an important position in most
organizations as is evidenced by the growing number of
journals and articles devoted to the value of information,
Information Resource Managers, database management systems,
and other such concepts related to the development,
maintenance and management of organizational information
resources. Two recent and important factors, however, are
beginning to stimulate interest in the more decentralized and
personal DSS application of computers. One of these factors
has been the increasing familiarity with and acceptance by
managers of the capabilities of the computer. The second
factor is the need to exploit the new hardware and software
technology to help managers make better decisions in an
environment which has suddenly become characterized by
inflation, uncertainty, economic swings and governmental
regulation [Ref. 21: p. 4]. The DSS emphasis on effectiveness
is more appropriate for dealing with change than is the
efficiency provided by MIS [Ref. 85: pp. 19-34].
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B. EFFECTIVENESS VS. EFFICIENCY
While the ultimate goal of any manager or organization
would be to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency, the
two criteria of performance must be balanced and play
different roles depending on the maturity and environment of
the various organizational functions. Efficiency implies
maximum output for minimum input. It is essentially
programmatic in mature organizations operating in stable
environments. Effectiveness, on the other hand, involves
more judgement in identifying what must be done and how it
must be done. It requires adaptation and learning, at the
risk of redundancy and false starts. For example, while
research and development can be thought of as a risky and
inefficient investment of resources, it's purpose is usually
to provide for future effectiveness [Ref. 21: p. 7].
C. STRUCTURED VS. UNSTRUCTURED
The above destinction between effectiveness and
efficiency in decision-making is central to the concept of
DSS and their application to unstructured or semi-structured
problems faced by managers. Most texts on the subject of
DSS's employ Herbert C. Simon's paradigm of problem-solving
processes to explain the continuum of structured through
unstructured problems. Basically, he has stated that the
process of problem-solving involves three discernable, but
iterative steps [Ref. 86: p. 6]:
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- The intelligence phase--searching the environment for
conditions calling for decision. Gathering data
- The design phase--inventing, developing, and analyzing
possible courses of action
- The choice phase—selecting a particular course of action
from those available.
Problems, or the process of problem-solving, then can
range from the structured to the unstructured, depending on
how easily identified are the information needs and processes
involved in each of these three problem-solving steps.
Structured, or as Simon calls them, programmed decisions
are:
...repetitive and routine, to the extent that a definite
procedure has been worked out for handling them so that
they don't have to be treated de novo each time they occur
[Ref. 86: p. 7].
That is, each phase can be readily described and thus could
be programmed for computer processing. Transactions for
customers can thus be handled completely automatically at
bank automated cash tellers.
Unstructured, or non-programmed decisions, on the other
hand, are novel and consequential. Simon continues:
There is no cut & dried method for handling the problem
because it hasn't arisen before, or because its precise
nature and structure are elusive or complex, or because it
is so important that it deserves a cus torn- tai lor ed
treatment. ...the system has no specific procedures to
deal with situations like the one at hand, but must fall
back on whatever general capacity it has for intelligent,
adaptive, problem-oriented action.
Most DSS experts agree that such problems remain unsupported
by computers today and are left strictly to the manager's
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judgement and experience. None of the steps in Simon's
decision-making or problem-solving paradigm can be
programmed. In the intelligence phase, we are unable to
define the conditions that allow us to even recognize the
problem. We are likewise unable, in the design phase, to
specify how to create methodologies to solve the problem. An
example of such a problem would be the forecasting of women's
taste in shoes. No clear criteria can be identified for
selecting a best solution in the choice phase. Thus, the
entire problem is unstructured [Ref. 21: p. 95].
Most problems, however, fall somewhere between these two
extremes and are called "semi-structured" problems. One or
more of the phases of intelligence, design, and choice can be
defined. This is where DSS can be the most effective.
Semistructured problems or tasks require the judgement of the
manager or decision-maker for those unspecif iable phases, but
can be supported by models or data which reflect the known
criteria for the other phases. Often, with experience and
knowledge gained over time, such problems can become
sufficiently structured to permit total automation. Until
then, however, the man-machine interaction provided in a DSS




D. INFORMATION NEEDS DIFFER
Three categories of managerial activity have been
identified by Anthony [Ref. 87: pp. 24-27] as distinguishable
in that, while each faces semi-structured problems, their
information needs differ in scope, detail and currency.
Stxat.ec[_ic planners need aggregate data for long-range
planning. Management control personnel need some degree of
detail and operate in shorter-range planning to translate
strategic plans into resource requirements. Operational
control personnel use detailed and current data for direction
of actual production.
Anthony's framework has implications for the design and
development of DSS's. First, it is apparent that all levels
of managerial activity are involved in semi-structured
problem solving. Thus DSS application in the organization is
not restricted to top management. Secondly, given the
differing information needs and characteristics associated
with each level, it follows that DSS's must be highly
tailored to the specific use or developed with sufficient
capabilities and flexibility so as to permit rapid transition
from one type of task or problem to the next. It is also
evident that the supporting data base for DSS's in
operational control would differ radically from that which
would support DSS's in the strategic planning area. The same
can be said for the types of models incorporated in DSS's
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which support these different managerial activities.
Furthermore, the design, development and implementation of
DSS's among different managerial activity levels would
necessitate the involvement of different specialists from the
systems group in the organization.
E. COMPONENTS OF A DSS
To realize the potential of a DSS in any of the organi-
zational contexts described above, a set of hardware and
software components must be designed and assembled. While
the particular design will depend on the specific application
of the DSS, some generalizations can be made about the basic
components. First, and most importantly, a DSS involves the
human decision-maker. This decision-maker, usually a manager,
operates in a unique environment and is responsible for a
given number of tasks. Figure A-l illustrates the relation-
ship between the decision-maker, the task, the environment
and the collection of components which make up a DSS.
/^
Figure A-l. Man-Machine Environment
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The components which make up the DSS include a data base,
a model base, and a dialog language which interfaces the
decision-maker with the system. Each of these components
requires an associated management system to permit
manipulation and access by the user. Figure A-2 depicts the
logical relationship of these components and their respective
management systems [Ref. 82: p. 29].
data base
user
Figure A-2. DSS Components
1. The Dialog Subsystem
The dialog subsystem of a DSS is the DSS in the eyes
of the user. All of the capabilities of the DSS must be
articulated and implemented through the dialog. This dialog
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subsystem can be further broken down into three parts [Ref.
81: 2p. 30].
a. The Action Language
What the user can do in communicating with the
system. May include such options as the availability of a
regular keyboard, function keys, touch panels, joy stick,
voice commands, etc.
b. The Display or Presentation Languages
What the user sees. The display language includes
opinions such as a character or line printer, a display
screen, graphics, color, plotters, or audio output.
c. The Knowledge Base
What the user must know to use the system
effectively. May consist of a manual of available commands
and their descriptions. May be displayed on the screen or
available upon request with a "help" command.
The richness and flexibility of the dialog
interface will depend on the strength and variety of these
capabilities. The success of the entire DSS depends in large
part on how user-friendly the dialog subsystem appears to the
user. Managers seldom wish to learn complex languages or to
memorize illogically-designated commands for functions. The
more logical the commands and the more the dialog resembles
natural language as employed in the context of the task at
hand, the more likely the system is to be used and
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appreciated by managers. The following capabilities of a
dialog subsystem further enhance the chances of success of
the DSS [Ref. 82: p. 31] :
- The ability to handle a variety of dialog styles, and to
shift among them at the user's choice
- The ability to accommodate user actions with a variety of
input devices
- The ability to present data with a variety of formats and
output devices
- The ability to provide flexible support for the user's
knowledge base.
Dialogs can take the form of question and answer
routines, report format blanks, menu selections, or command
languages. Most DSS will incorporate some combination of
these for wider application and increased flexibility. They
usually include other conventions to provide error messages,
acknowledgements, verification requests, default values, and
possibly override features for experienced users [Ref. 82: p.
207] .
The choice of a dialog form is an important
decision in the design of a DSS for two reasons: (1) an
inappropriate format will discourage use of the DSS and
thereby reduce its effectiveness, and (2) the dialog
component of a DSS often constitutes the largest percentage




The design of the dialog component should begin
with an analysis of the decision-making process and
environment of the user. Such an analysis would identify the
communications style of the user, the response- t ime
requirements, the desired outputs, and the required input
parameters. The goal should be to provide effective
representations or displays and understandable control
mechanisms. In many cases, software packages can be
purchased 'off the shelf to meet the needs of the user and
reduce development costs. Some applications, on the other
hand, are so unique as to require programming, either in-
house or by a contractor.
The effectiveness of a chosen dialog can be
measured by number of errors, learning time, user perceptions
and, although more difficultly, by effect on the decision-
making process and its results, (i.e., number of alternatives
analyzed) [Ref. 82: p. 207].
2. The Data Subsystem
The data subsystem of a DSS is visible to the user
only through the use of the dialog to access desired data.
Recent advances and developments in database management
provide a number of powerful functions, often in the form of
"off the shelf" packages. However, the data base of a DSS
differs from that of a MIS in two significant ways; it is
dependent on external sources as well as internally-generated
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data, and it must accommodate individual user's needs for
storing and rapidly accessing both personal and corporate
data. For these reasons, it is often necessary to create for
the DSS a separate data base, part of which is extracted from
the general corporate data base (or MIS) and part of which is
drawn from external data sources. Figure A-3 illustrates the
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Figure A-3. Extracted Data Base
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Carlson and Sprague identify some desirable features
of a DSS data base subsystem [Ref. 82: p. 32] :
- The ability to combine a variety of data sources through
a data capture and extraction process
- The ability to add and delete data sources quickly and
easily
- The ability to portray logical data structures in user
terms so that the user understands what is available and
can specify needed additions and deletions
- The ability to handle personal and unofficial data so
that the user can experiment with alternatives based on
personal judgement
- The ability to manage this wide variety of data with a
full range of data management functions
When the user of a DSS invokes the dialog to gain
access to the data base, it is the Database Management System
(DBMS) which actually translates the request and accesses the
data base to create, maintain, update, or display data as
instructed. In some DSS designs it may be possible to share
the DBMS which serves the central corporate information
system. Usually, however, it is wise to incorporate in the
DSS a separate DBMS for faster response time and more
flexible data retrieval functions.
Conversely, it is seldom recommended that the DSS
design should attempt to create an entirely separate data
base of its own. Instead it should take advantage of the
involved and time-consuming efforts already invested in the
corporate data base. This can be accomplished by referencing
the corporate data base whenever data is needed or by
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periodically extracting needed elements into a smaller and
separate DSS data base. Reliance on the corporate data base
for internally-generated data needs results in decreased
costs, more consistent and reliable information, simplified
DSS design and development and fewer security problems [Ref.
82: p. 223].
Data resident in the data base can be organized in a
number of ways. Generally, a DBMS is designed specifically
for the one particular organization of data within the data
base. Thus, the selection of the DBMS for a DSS depends on
the data model used in the corresponding data base, which, as
described above, is probably already functioning within the
organization.
The various data models are described briefly below:
- Record Model: Data is organized by records which are
composed of related fields. Usually each record has one
or more key fields which permit sorting of the data by
attributes recorded in that field. For example, each
customer's record identifies all loan accounts
corresponding to that customer.
- Relational Model: Data is organized in records and
fields, where records are grouped by relation. For
example, all car loan accounts are grouped separately
from all signature loan accounts.
- Hierarchical Model: Data is organized as in the
relational model but the various groups are stratified,
with upper-level groups having access to relational
groups at lower levels. For example, the upper-level
group of all loan accounts by number can access the
lower-level groups of associated customers by loan
account number. This model creates data redundancy and
can be difficult to alter or update, but provides other
offsetting benefits such as faster access and less need
for the user to understand the data organization.
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- Network Model: Much like the hierarchical model except
that data redundancy is eliminated or reduced by the use
of logical versus actual records. Pointers are used to
direct search procedures to the actual location of
desired records instead of duplicating them wherever they
are related to a group.
- Rule Model: Often called 'knowledge-based' systems,
these models organize data and information in the form of
rules or conditions. For example, when asked to compute
a credit rating, the DBMS for a rule model would
determine the necessary data input based on its rules for
such a computation, would access or request input of such
data, and would follow a predetermined set of "if - then"
production rules to examine assets, liabilities, etc. in
order to determine loan elligibility. This type of model
is gaining increased recognition as it can support the
speed and self-updating requirements of Artificial
Intelligence [Ref. 88: p. 560].
Another criteria for selecting a DBMS for a DSS is
the required number and variety of data operations and







Several other DBMS choice criteria are listed and
briefly explained below. It is important to remember that
the more capable the DBMS, the more overhead will be involved
in processing time and in development costs. The need for
these capabilities must be weighed against both the overall
development costs and the differences in processing or
response time to the user.
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- Support for Memory: Workspaces for intermediate results;
libraries for saving workspaces; links or indices;
triggers to remind decision makers of needed data or
operations
- Data Reduction: Abstraction from large amounts of
data through subsetting, combination, or aggregation
- Detail Focus: To permit managers to focus on necessary
level of detail
- Multiple Source: Ability to access various internal and
external data sources
- Catalogue of Sources: To identify for the manager's
intelligence-gathering phase of decision-making, all
available sources of relevant information
- Wide Time Frame: To permit analysis of both historical
data and projections of current data into the future
- Private Data Bases: At least part of the DSS data base
should be accessible only by the user
-Varying Degrees of Accuracy: At times the manager may
need precision; other times he may prefer to
"satisfice" and use estimates in order to save time on
less critical decisions. Should provide indication of
degree of accuracy of data supplied user
- Random Access: Fast access to desired data. Serial
access probably too slow and frustrating for managers
- Transparency to the User: Users generally not skilled or
interested in programming languages. User should be free
of need to know details of data storage
3. The Model Subsystem
While decision-making models have been developed for
many years, managers seldom became adept or interested in
their use and have relied instead on their own heuristic
methods of problem-solving. The integration of appropriate
models, data, and a method of communication and flexible
manipulation among models and data as permitted by a DSS
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provides managers with the flexibility and and ease of
manipulation which was not available with the independent
models. Thus, managers provided with DSS's are much more
likely to develop an appreciation for the "what-if" analysis
capabilities of models or simulation [Ref. 82: p. 258].
The modeling component of a DSS is the primary tool
for supporting the design and choice phases of decision-
making. These phases include such activities as [Ref. 82: p.
260] :
*projection *deduction
analysis *creation of alternatives
'•"'comparison *optimization
simulation
In general, support for these activities depends on feedback
and interaction between the decision-maker and the modeling
component. The DSS should allow the examination of
intermediate results, the accommodation of subjective
judgement, and modification of input or model choice as the
problem, or the user's perception of the problem, changes.
Other key capabilities required of a DSS's modeling component
include [Ref. 82: p. 33]:
- The ability to create new models quickly and easily
- The ability to access and integrate model building
blocks"
- The ability to catalogue and maintain a wide range of
models to support all levels of users
- The ability to interrelate these models with appropriate
linkages through the data base
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- The ability to manage the model base with management
functions analogous to data base management (e.g.,
mechanisms for storing, cataloging, linking, and
accessing models)
Barbosa and Herko identify several other important
requirements of a DSS modeling component [Ref. 89: pp. 1-
12] :
a. Interface
The user should be able to work in the problem-
solving environment without unnecessary distractions. The
user should not have to interrupt this process and
laboriously supply some control parameters before continuing.
The control parameters should be expressed in
terms with which the user will be familiar. He or she should
be able to think about only those parameters that have a
direct bearing on the problem-solving process.
b. Control
The user should be given a spectrum of control.
If possible, the system should support manual operation as
well as fully automatic operation. This permits the user to
select the level of algorithmic operation that seems most
suitable. It also enables the user to learn more easily by
allowing him or her to proceed as slowly as desired.
The control mechanism should allow the user to
introduce subjective information as demanded by the problem
solution process. It should not require the user to specify
all constraints a priori. This direct human control of the
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solution process can make up for deficiencies in the
algorithm and will often permit the system to contain a
simpler algorithm, frequently resulting in smaller
information burden on the user.
c. Flexibility
The algorithmic and manual operations should be
interchangeable in the sense that the user can develop part
of a solution via manual methods and then continue with the
algorithm, or vice versa. This statement implies that the
range of all operations can be cascaded in an arbitrary way.
Both flexibility and control allow the user to construct a
solution process that best suits the problem. This idea of
interchangeability of operations is deceptively simple, but
it has far-reaching implications. This is the manner by
which flexibility and control are achieved. Thus a creative
solution process can be composed of a sequence of
subprocesses.
d. Feedback
The system should provide sufficient feedback so
that the user is fully cognizant of the state of the solution
generation process at all times. This feedback is essential
for supporting human control of the process.
The design process itself should make use of
feedback. Valuable information can be derived from
introduction of the initial system or prototype to the users.
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Their feedback should be especially meaningful in the area of
usability.
The modeling component will be comprised of a
model base, or library, and a software system to manage the
models in the library. This management software is known as
the Model Base Management System (MBMS). It also serves to
interact with both the DBMS and the DGMS of the data base and
dialog components, respectively.
The model base will contain both canned and user-
built, ad-hoc models designed to support a variety of tasks
at any or all of the three levels of managerial activity.
Smaller models may be used as building blocks for creating
larger ones.
The MBMS will handle the storage, retrieval,
manipulation, creation and operation of the models in the
model base. It will interact with the dialog component to
permit the user to accomplish interactive modeling which
permits interruption, sequence variation, and parameter
changes. It will interact with the data component of the DSS
to access input data, to update data based on results, to
accept updates necessitated by changes in the data base, and




DSS imply the integration and management of data, models
and an interactive dialog to extend a user's judgement by
permitting analyses of data. DSS are not replacements for,
but rather, aids to the human decision-making processes.
Each application will involve the tailoring of the user's
data requirements to a specific decision-making context.
Choices of database management design, dialog styles and
supporting models are therefore highly context-dependent.
The goals of applicability, flexibility and ease of use are
common to all DSS. The degree to which these goals are
realized in the design and integration of the basic
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